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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC. 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GLEN BARNES, An Individual, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14397 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit by a heating and electrical goods supplier, 
A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC. against GLEN BARNES to recover 
payment upon a personal guarantee executed by the said GLEN 
BARNES for goods supplied to BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC 
COMPANY. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After conducting discovery, including depositions of A. 
RAY CURTIS, President of A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC., and 
HUGH BARNES, President of BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
who was also a co-guarantor with GLEN BARNES on a Personal 
Guarantee executed by both HUGH BARNES AND GLEN BARNES, GLEN 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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BARNES moved for Summary Judgment against A. RAY CURTIS 
COMPANY, INC. based upon its affirmative defense of accord 
and satisfaction and, therefore, release. A. RAY CURTIS 
COMPANY, INC. then filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon a failure of consideration to support either an 
accord and satisfaction or a release. The Court below 
denied the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion and granted the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, INC. seeks reversal of the order 
denying its Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment and a reversal 
of the order granting GLEN BARNES' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY is a Utah Corporation 
in good standing (R 56, 73) which company has been and is 
engaged in supplying heating and air conditioning materials 
and accessories. (R 72) 
Between the dates of November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970 
the defendant, GLEN BARNES, together with his father, HUGH 
BARNES, were officers in the business of BARNES HEATING & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah Corporation. (R 9, 11, 37; Hugh 
Barnes Deposition p. 7, lines 18 to 20.) 
Prior to November 11, 1969 plaintiff requested the 
personal guarantees of HUGH BARNES and defendant GLEN BARNES 
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as additional security that the account of BARNES HEATING & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY with plaintiff would be paid. (R 56, 57, 
37; Hugh Barnes Deposition p. 13,) 
The Personal Guarantee Agreement was signed by HUGH R. 
BARNES and GLEN BARNES who incidentally designated themselves 
on the said guarantee as "President" and "Vice-President," 
respectively. (R 11) It was at all times understood between 
the parties that each of these gentlemen signed in their 
individual capacities and would be personally liable for the 
debt incurred by BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY within 
the scope of the Personal Guarantee Agreement. (R 73; Hugh 
Barnes Deposition p. 13, lines 6 to 10; A. Ray Curtis Deposition 
p. 5, lines 3 to 18.) 
In reliance upon the validity of this Personal Guarantee 
Agreement, plaintiff supplied BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC 
COMPANY with heating and air conditioning materials and 
supplies between November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970. (R 1, 
8) A copy of the Guarantee Agreement in question is shown 
in the Record at page 11. 
With the exception of some work that BARNES HEATING & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY performed for plaintiff, BARNES HEATING & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY did not pay plaintiff for the materials 
supplied between November 11, 1969 and June 1, 1970. After 
all deductions, claims and offsets were rendered, the amount 
-3-
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of $8,488.06 remained owing on the balance for the materials 
supplied. (R 1, 8) No party disputes that the total 
amount of $8,488.06 was due and owing plaintiff. (R 8, 
Deposition of Hugh Barnes pp. 18 & 19, "Stipulation of 
Counsel"; see also, pp. 22 & 23.) 
Plaintiff subsequently accepted a personal check from 
HUGH BARNES for the amount of $3,000.00. (R 1, 8) The 
check was executed with the following restrictive endorsement: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes payment in 
full of interest and principal to A. RAY CURTIS 
COMPANY from BARNES HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY. 
Plaintiff cashed the check and reduced the balance of the 
obligation to $5,488.06. (R 11 & 12.) 
Both prior to the time at which the check was received 
and subsequent thereto, plaintiff continually expressed its 
intent to both GLEN BARNES and HUGH BARNES that the $3,000.00 
check satisfied only HUGH BARNES1 portion of the obligation 
to plaintiff under the Personal Guarantee Agreement and 
plaintiff would request GLEN BARNES to satisfy the balance 
of $5,488.06. At no time was plaintiff informed or made 
aware of any agreement between HUGH BARNES, BARNES HEATING & 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, and defendant as to the respective amounts 
for which each would be responsible in discharging the 
indebtedness to the plaintiff. (Depositions of A. RAY 
CURTIS pp. 18 to 23, 25, 27; Deposition of HUGH BARNES pp. 
26, 29 to 31, 33, 34.) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff requested the remaining balance from defendant, 
and defendant refused to pay said amount. (R 1/ 8). As a 
result, this action was brought for $5,48 8.06, plus interest, 
attorney1s fees and costs against defendant. (R 1) 
Defendant answered plaintiff's Complaint alleging 
accord and satisfaction, but admitted that the total amount 
of the debt due plaintiff was $8,488.06. (R 8, 9) Defendant 
further alleged that he was not personally liable on the 
Guarantee Agreement, but had signed only in a representative 
capacity. (R 9) Defendant subsequently brought a Motion 
for Summary Judgment based upon the defense of accord and 
satisfaction and failure to reserve rights in writing. (R 
34, 39, 40) 
Plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion For Summary Judgment (R 
41) and a Memorandum of Law in support thereof and in opposition 
to defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, (R 43) alleging 
the absence of a meeting of the minds between the parties 
and the absence of consideration to support an accord and 
satisfaction. (R 46, 48, 50) 
The trial court found that defendant was personally 
liable upon the Guarantee Agreement (R 73) but granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant based upon accord and 
satisfaction. (R 73, 74) Plaintiff has brought this appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING GLEN BARNES1 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND INCORRECTLY DENIED A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, 
INC.'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
POINT I 
AN ENFORCEABLE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY 
CONSIDERATION, AND PARTIAL PAYMENT OF AN UNDISPUTED DEBT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSIDERATION. 
In order to establish a valid accord and satisfaction, 
the required elements of a contract must exist. American 
Jurisprudence 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction" §4, at 217 sets 
forth the following rule: 
"The discharge of claims by way of accord and satisfaction 
is dependent upon a contract, express or implied; and 
it follows that the essentials necessary to valid 
contracts generally must be present in a contract of 
accord and satisfaction. Therefore, the following 
elements are essential: (1) A proper subject matter, 
(2) Competent parties, (3) An assent or meeting of the 
minds of the parties, and (4) A consideration." 
The above reference from American Jurisprudence 2d 
cites the Utah case of Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs. Fidelity 
Building and Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, 
(1938), (hereinafter, Badger) which quotes the cited language 
at 676. The Utah Supreme Court also made the following 
observation: 
"Nor does the fact that plaintiff signed a receipt in 
full evidence or infer that a dispute existed. Nor 
would such a receipt be controlling as showing an 
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accord and satisfaction had been effected. In the 
absence of a dispute or other consideration, the part 
payment received would only discharge the debt pro 
tanto, ... Having pleaded an accord and satisfaction 
the burden was upon defendant to prove such defense." 
Id., at 677. 
Defendant here relies upon the endorsement of a personal 
check containing a recitation of an attempted accord and 
satisfaction. No evidence was offered by defendant to prove 
a dispute as to the amount due, nor has evidence been offered 
to show any legal consideration. It was the defendant's 
duty to show such consideration. Consequently, in the light 
of Badger, supra, it was reversible error for the lower 
court to rely solely upon an endorsement on a personal check 
as the basis for a finding of a valid and enforceable accord 
and satisfaction which would support the granting of defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the dismissal with prejudice 
of plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant 
admits in his Answer to plaintiff's Complaint that the 
amount of the debt is not and was never in dispute. Under 
Badger that leaves only the possibility of an independent 
"consideration" to support any valid accord and satisfaction. 
There was no such consideration in the present case. 
Badger, supra, also cites the Utah Supreme Court decision 
set forth in Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of U.S., 94 Utah 532 72 P.2d 1060, (1937) (hereinafter, 
Browning) which at page 1068 states: 
- 7 -
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"...there must be consideration for the agreement. 
Settlement of an unliquidated or a disputed claim where 
the parties are apart in good faith presents such 
consideration. Where the claim is definite and there 
is no dispute but admittance of its owing, the agreement 
to take a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction 
is not good unless attended by some consideration.... 
If a doctor sends me a bill for $20.00 when it should 
have been $30.00 and I pay it, it is not an accord and 
satisfaction. It is merely payment of less than I 
owe." 
In F.M.A. Financial Corporation vs. Build, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 80, 402 P.2d 670, at 672 and 673 (1965), the Court 
states the general rule, uniformly followed by Utah Courts 
in cases of accord and satisfaction, that where a claim is 
for a definite and undisputed amount, i.e., for a liquidated 
amount, which is also past due, an agreement by a creditor 
to take a lesser amount, even when paid, does not discharge 
the whole debt. Since the creditor receives only that which 
he is already entitled to receive, there is no consideration 
for the agreement. 
See also Bennett vs. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) wherein defendant raised 
the issue of accord and satisfaction with regard to a check 
which stated "Payment in full of the account stated below -
endorsement of check by Payee is sufficient receipt". The 
Utah Supreme Court in that case found that there was no 
accord and satisfaction which entitled the plaintiff to 
maintain his claim against the defendant. 
-8-
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The case of Phillips Petroleum Company vs. Hart, 25 
Utah 2d 244, 480 P.2d 131 (1971) adopts the following cogent 
language of Corbin on Contracts, Section 1292, at 177 through 
178. 
"There is no doubt that if no part of the claim is 
in dispute and the creditor sends by mistake a 
bill showing less than the amount actually due, 
the payment of the amount does not operate as a 
full satisfaction, even though the debtor sent his 
check endorsed 'to balance account to date1. 
Under such circumstances a promise by the creditor 
to accept the check as full satisfaction would be 
without any sufficient consideration." Id., at 
133. 
See also, Reliable Furniture Company vs. American Home 
Assurance Company, 24 Utah 2d 93, 446 P. 2d 368 (1970) and 
Hintze vs. Search, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P. 2d 202 (1968). 
There has been, at all times, complete agreement between 
plaintiff, defendant and HUGH BARNES as to the extent of the 
debt owed by BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. There is, 
therefore, a liquidated, undisputed claim. Prior to the 
time that HUGH BARNES tendered payment of $3,000 on a debt 
of $8,488.06 there was no dispute as to the amount owed. In 
the words of the Utah Supreme Court in Browning, "...[where] 
the claim is definite and [there is] no dispute but an 
admittance of its owing, the agreement to take a lesser 
amount even followed by satisfaction is not good unless 
attended by some consideration." Browning, at 1068. The 
payment of the $3,000 cannot constitute consideration since 
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the plaintiff received only what he was otherwise entitled 
to by the terms of plaintiff's agreement with HUGH BARNES 
and defendant as guarantors of the obligation of BARNES 
HEATING & ELECTRIC COMPANY. "Under no conceivable theory 
can the doing of an act which a party is already obligated 
to do, constitute the consideration for a new promise on the 
part of the other party." Van Tassell v. Lewis, 118 Utah 
356, 222 P.2d 350 (1950) at 355. An accord and satisfaction 
to settle for a lesser amount would be just such a new 
promise. In the document entitled "Summary Judgment", 
prepared by defendant's counsel, there is no recital of a 
finding of fact or "statement of facts" which show a meeting 
of the minds and/or new consideration to support a valid 
accord and satisfaction or a release. In the absence of 
additional consideration of some sort any alleged accord and 
satisfaction is unenforceable against the plaintiff. 
In the present case, the defendant has admitted the 
amount due and the trial court found upon the facts that 
defendant was personally liable upon the guarantee. Therefore, 
under the cited case law, defendant is still liable to 
plaintiff in the amount of the unpaid balance since HUGH 
BARNES' payment of $3,000 only reduced the debt pro tanto. 
Accordingly, the court below erred in granting defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in denying plaintiff's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
WITHOUT A MEETING OF THE MINDS THERE CAN BE NO ENFORCEABLE 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
American Jurisprudence 2d states that in addition to 
consideration, a valid accord and satisfaction requires a 
meeting of the minds between the parties to the transaction. 
American Jurisprudence 2d, "Accord and Satisfaction," § 4. 
There was no such meeting of the minds in the instant case. 
Both parties in their depositions differ as to just 
which parties the $3,000 payment would affect. A. RAY 
CURTIS, President of the plaintiff Corporation , negotiated 
directly with HUGH BARNES. In MR. CURTIS1 deposition at 
pages 18 to 19, he states that at no time did he intend nor 
was it the intention of the parties that either BARNES 
HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY or defendant be relieved of the 
duty to pay the balance of the debt outstanding after receipt 
of the three thousand dollar ($3,000) partial payment. 
HUGH BARNES has testified that the only statements made 
to him by plaintiff's President were "All right," ..." if 
you will dig that much money up, I will let you off the 
hook," and "You are out." Deposition of HUGH BARNES, at 25 
and 26, lines 22, 23 and 11. These statements were made 
directly to HUGH BARNES. HUGH BARNES further stated that he 
never talked to plaintiff1s President about any intention on 
-ll--...-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his part that the defendant, GLEN BARNES, be relieved of his 
duty to pay. See Deposition of HUGH BARNES, at 29, lines 14 
to 16. 
Based upon the testimony of the only two parties who 
dealt directly with each other, the minds of the two parties 
apparently did not meet but passed by each other as two 
"ships in the night11 never reaching a common understanding 
of what the one meant by the word "you" and what the other 
understood. Plaintiff's President used the word meaning a 
singular "you" and HUGH BARNES apparently understood the 
word as plural. 
Plaintiff's treatment of the $3,000 check was in no way 
inconsistent with his understanding. The restriction was 
written on a personal check of HUGH BARNES. It appears to 
be the kind of check which he would use to pay a personal 
obligation for which he was liable. His restriction states 
that it is payment to plaintiff from BARNES HEATING AND 
ELECTRIC COMPANY. In light of the fact that HUGH BARNES 
gave the plaintiff his personal check, and giving due consideration 
to what was said by the parties and what was understood by 
plaintiff at the time of the negotiations with respect to 
the check, it is not unreasonable for plaintiff to have 
understood the restriction in this manner: "Payment in full 
of interest and principal to A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY relieving 
-12-
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HUGH BARNES personally from further payment on the account 
of BARNES HEATING AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. Any other interpretation 
indicates that there was clearly a failure of the parties1 
minds to meet with respect to just who would be released by 
this payment. 
In view of the foregoing facts and cited law it is 
clear that there was no meeting of the minds. Where that 
element of an accord and satisfaction is absent, any such 
alleged accord and satisfaction is unenforceable. Where 
there is no enforceable accord and satisfaction, and the 
debt has been admitted and adjudged to be a personal one, 
there can be no room for reasonable men to differ, and 
plaintiff is therefore entitled to Summary Judgment. Accord-
ingly, it was reversible error for the court below to grant 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to deny plaintiff's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
POINT III 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AND A VALID AND SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION ANY ALLEGED RELEASE 
IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
As with an accord and satisfaction, a release is also a 
new contract between the parties. A valid and enforceable 
release must, therefore, be supported by adequate considera-
tion. Also, a meeting of the minds must occur between the 
-13- . 
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parties before a release is effective. American Jurisprudence 
sets forth the following rule: "Ordinarily to be effective, 
a release must be based on a consideration of some sort," 66 
Am,Jur. 2d, "Release", § 8 at 683. In the same section of 
the cited treatise it states that if a release is to be 
valid, consideration must be present and the consideration 
must be valuable. Id.. , at 685. Under universally recognized 
principles, the performance of a legal duty is not sufficient 
consideration to support a release. Therefore, the partial 
payment of a liquidated, undisputed, and material obligation 
does not furnish sufficient consideration for a release of 
the balance of the underlying obligation. 
In Roberts1 Investment Company vs. Gibbons and Reed Concrete 
Products Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 449 P.2d, 116, (1969) the 
contention was made by Roberts that because it had made 
partial payment and received a release of all claims from 
Gibbons and Reed, it was relieved from any liability arising 
under a mechanic's lien statute. The Utah Supreme Court, 
after finding that payment "earlier" rather than "later" was 
not sufficient consideration for the release, stated that 
the amount owed was a liquidated sum and that there was no 
dispute that the amount was then due and owing; therefore, 
there was no consideration for the release of the claim and 
the release was not binding upon Gibbons and Reed. The 
~14-
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Supreme Court held in favor of Gibbons and Reed and ordered 
Roberts1 Investment Company to pay the balance of the claim 
to Gibbons and Reed. 38 Am,Jur, 2d, "Guaranty", § 80 pro-
vides the following rule with respect to an agreement dis-
charging a guarantor and the necessity of adequate considera-
tion: 
"The agreement of a creditor to release the principal 
debtor's guarantor from liability under the guarantee 
contract is binding upon the creditor if the 
agreement possesses the elements of a contract. 
Thus, where there is sufficient consideration for 
the creditor's promise to release the guarantor 
from liability under the contract, the promise is 
binding and is a good defense to an action by the 
creditor on the guaranty. However, where there is 
no consideration to support the creditor's promise 
to release the guarantor from his contractual 
liability under the guaranty, the promise is not 
binding and is not a defense to an action by the 
creditor on the guaranty. Thus, the fact that a 
release of a guarantor has been reduced to writing 
and signed by the creditor is not sufficient—in 
and of itself and absent a consideration—to make 
the release enforceable against the creditor; 
however, this rule has been changed in some juris-
dictions by virtue of special statutes." 
Utah has no such special statute. For the same reasons set 
forth in Point I, supra, relating to the absence of sufficient 
consideration to support a valid accord and satisfaction, 
there was no consideration whatsoever to support any alleged 
release. As stated, the partial or full performance of a 
duty which one is legally obligated to do is not sufficient 
consideration to support an agreement of a contractual . 
nature, be it an accord and satisfaction or a release. 
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For like reasons there was no meeting of the minds with 
reference to the alleged release. See discussion in Point 
II, supra. Consequently, any purported release as it relates 
to the defendant, GLEN BARNES, is unenforceable. Accordingly, 
the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been 
granted. 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT, U.C.A. 15-4-4 AND 15-4-5 
(1953) IS INAPPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS NO ENFORCEABLE RELEASE. 
Because any supposed release which may have been given 
is not enforceable in this case for the reasons stated in 
Point III, the Utah Joint Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann., 
Section 15-4-1 et.seq. (1953), has no application. Since 
the subject joint obligation was neither validly released 
nor discharged, defendant remains legally liable under the 
terms of the Guaranty Agreement for the amount of debt not 
yet paid. The purpose of the cited statute is to relieve a 
co-obligor where, and to the extent, a creditor releases a 
co-obligor to the detriment of a remaining co-obligor. 
Plateau Uranium Investment Corp. v. Sugar and Ulmer, 8 Utah 
2d 5, 326 P.2d 1022 (1958) at 1024. Defendant suffers no 
detriment by an invalid, unenforceable release of his co-
obligor. Only a valid, enforceable release activates the 
provisions of the Utah Joint Obligations Act to release a 
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co-obligor of any liability on a debt. There was no valid 
release in the present case. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT IS NOT RELIEVED OF LIABILITY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1953) SECTIONS 15-4-4 AND 15-4-5, EVEN IF APPLICABLE. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Section 15-4-4 states: 
"Subject to the provisions of Section 15-4-3, the 
obligee's release or discharge of one or more of 
several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of 
joint and several obligors, shall not discharge 
co-obligors against whom the obligee in writing 
and as part of the same transaction as the release 
or discharge expressly reserves his rights; and in 
the absence of such a reservation of rights shall 
discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided 
in Section 15-4-5. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Section 15-4-3 provides that the 
Defendant is entitled to a credit for the $3,000.00 paid to 
plaintiff by HUGH BARNES. However, the cited provision does 
not totally release GLEN BARNES, a joint obligor, where 
there is no written reservation against him. It merely 
refers to Section 15-4-5 to determine the extent of the 
discharge. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 15-4-5 provides for different 
results depending upon the knowledge which plaintiff had of 
the contractual relationship between HUGH BARNES and defendant 
at the time of any alleged release of HUGH BARNES. Because 
the plaintiff, A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, had no knowledge of 
any agreement between HUGH BARNES and defendant, the second 
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paragraph of Section 15-4-5 applies. If one indulges in the 
likely assumption that the defendant GLEN BARNES and HUGH 
BARNES may have agreed to be liable for fifty percent (50%) 
of the amount owed the plaintiff, then the addition of 
parenthetical statements illustrative of the present case 
clarifies Section 15-4-5. It states: 
"If an obligee so releasing or discharging an 
obligor has not then such knowledge or reason to 
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor 
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of 
two amounts, namely; (a) the amount of the fractional 
share of the obligor released or discharged, 
[$8,488.06 less $3,000 = $5,488.06], or (b) the 
amount that such obligor was bound by his contract 
or relation with the co-obligor to pay [$8,488.06 
less $4,244.03 = $4,244.03]. (Parenthetical 
phrases and Emphasis added.) 
Under the Personal Guarantee Agreement, both HUGH 
BARNES and defendant, GLEN BARNES, are jointly and severally 
obligated to pay one hundred percent (100%) of the debt to 
the plaintiff. Each had a legal right of equal contribution 
as against the other. There was apparently no definite 
agreement between HUGH BARNES and defendant as to the respec-
tive fractional share of the liability to plaintiff each 
would bear. Further, plaintiff, A. RAY CURTIS COMPANY, was 
never made aware of the existence or terms of any such 
agreement. The second paragraph of Section 15-4-5 provides 
that the release of HUGH BARNES has the effect of reducing 
the obligation of the defendant, GLEN BARNES, to the plaintiff 
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by the lesser of (a) the amount which HUGH BARNES actually 
paid, or (b) one-half, assuming HUGH BARNES and GLEN BARNES 
agreed among themselves to be equally liable on the obliga-
tion owed to the plaintiff; whichever amount is less. Under 
alternative (a), as illustrated in the cited material, 
supra , defendant's obligation would be reduced by $3,000. 
Section 15-4-5 states that the indebtedness would be reduced 
by "...the lesser..." of alternative (a) or alternative (b), 
defendant is liable to the plaintiff in the amount of $5,488.06. 
($8,488.06 less $3,000 = $5,488.06). 
American Jurisprudence 2d sustains plaintiff's position. 
"Where the Uniform Joint Obligations Act has been 
adopted, a release which does not contain an ex-
press reservation of rights against a co-obligor 
will discharge the co-obligor to the extent of 
either the amount of the fractional shares of the 
released obligor, or the amount that such obligor 
was bound by his contract or relation with the 
obligor to pay". 66 Am.Jur. 2d, "Release," § 36 
at 715. (Emphasis added). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the cited authorities and foregoing analysis 
it is clear 
(1) That the Utah Joint Obligations Act, if applicable, 
operates to discharge the indebtedness of the 
defendant to the plaintiff only to the extent of 
the payment received from HUGH BARNES, namely 
$3,000.00, leaving a balance due the plaintiff of 
$5,488.06; Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2) That any alleged release and/or accord and sat-
isfaction must be supported by the elements of a 
valid contract, namely sufficient consideration 
and a meeting of the minds; 
(3) That there was no such meeting of the minds and/or 
valid and sufficient consideration to support a 
release and/or accord and satisfaction in this 
case; 
(4) That the "Summary Judgment", prepared by defendant's 
counsel, and entered by the Court below, contained 
no finding of a meeting of the minds between the 
parties and/or consideration sufficient to support 
any alleged release or accord and satisfaction; 
(5) That the Record herein clearly shows thcit there 
was no meeting of the minds and/or consideration 
to support any alleged release or accord and sat-
isfaction; 
(6) That the Court below consequently erred, as a 
matter of law, in finding a valid accord and 
satisfaction in the present case. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of the 
Third District Court should be reversed and remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in the 
amount of $5,488.06 plus interest, costs, and attorney's 
fees. 
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